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Abstract Finance ministries are increasingly involved in UN climate finance negotiations,
yet this development received very limited attention in the literature on climate finance or
climate negotiations. It is not obvious from the literature on bureaucratic politics how these
ministries will position themselves on climate finance: they may frame climate finance as
expenditure to be limited or as an instrument for correcting the market failure of climate
change. This paper investigates which frames have characterised the positions of finance
ministries on key issues in the climate finance negotiations, and whether the use of a given
frame corresponds to particular factors. Case studies of Denmark, India, Indonesia and the
USA based on official documents and interviews show that the position of each finance
ministry is generally consistent with one particular frame. The Indonesian and Danish
finance ministries predominantly framed climate finance as a way of correcting a market
failure. The Indian Ministry of Finance emphasised Common but Differentiated Respon-
sibilities, which fits with the budget frame. The US Treasury’s position similarly fits with
the budget frame while sharing elements of the market failure frame. Finance ministries
that had the lead on climate finance were more likely follow the budget frame. The use of
both frames cuts across the divide between industrialised and emerging economies. With
the exception of the USA, left- and right-wing governments were equally likely to adopt
either frame. These findings indicate that strengthening finance ministry forums built
around the market failure frame can be a way of reducing norm fragmentation.
Keywords Climate finance  Climate change  UNFCCC negotiations  Bureaucratic
politics  Finance ministries
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1 Introduction
A crucial aspect of the fragmented climate finance system is the diversity of positions held
by countries in United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
negotiations on climate finance (see special issue Editorial). In addition to the difference of
positions, existing literature has demonstrated the importance of bureaucratic politics for
negotiation positions (Kaarbo 1998; Downie 2014), including the role of finance ministries
(Skovgaard 2015). Finance ministries are increasingly involved in the climate finance
system, particularly in the UN climate finance negotiations. Yet, there is nothing preor-
dained about the role that finance ministries play in this context, since they may equally
well frame climate policy as tool to correct a market failure or as an expenditure to be
limited (Skovgaard 2012). In terms of climate finance negotiation positions, the former
frame (‘‘the budget frame’’) arguably implies limiting domestic expenditure on climate
finance and—in the case of developing countries1—maximising climate finance from
industrialised countries. The latter frame (‘‘the market failure frame’’) implies a willing-
ness to provide climate finance, a preference for channelling climate finance through
multilateral development banks (MDBs), and an emphasis on efficiency.
How the position of finance ministries is framed has significant repercussions for the
climate finance system, particularly regarding the fragmentation of norms and institutions
across the system.2 On the one hand, convergence between finance ministries from dif-
ferent countries around the market failure frame could reduce norm fragmentation within
the climate system, since the frame would support a set of transnationally shared norms
emphasising collective action. Yet, given that convergence around the market failure frame
would be shared transnationally between finance ministries but not necessarily within the
individual governments (see Skovgaard 2012), this scenario could lead to institutional
fragmentation between institutions supported not so much by different countries as by
different ministries. On the other hand, convergence around the budget frame could con-
stitute a domestic cause of increased norm fragmentation, since the finance ministries
would pull their national negotiation positions in the direction of less cooperative, more
self-interested stances. Arguably, in case of convergence around the budget frame, finance
ministries support or oppose norms depending on whether they would make them better off
fiscally, e.g. Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) being promoted by
developing countries (see special issue Editorial).3 Thus, frame convergence could cause
increased norm fragmentation and possibly also institutional fragmentation (since finance
ministries would support the institutions that improve their fiscal situation) along the
1 For the purposes of this article, developing countries are understood as those not listed in Annex II to the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and industrialised countries are understood as those listed
in Annex II.
2 On the definition and scope of this system, and on the concept of normative and institutional fragmen-
tation, see the special issue Editorial.
3 CBDR can also make sense from an equity perspective.
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industrialised/emerging country fault line. In a situation where the market failure frame
characterises the position of some finance ministries and the budget frame that of others,
the lines along which the finance ministries converge and diverge are crucial, e.g. if
developing finance ministries subscribe to one frame and industrialised finance ministries
to another.
Furthermore, in some countries, the finance ministry has the overarching (or lead)
responsibility for the climate finance negotiations, while in other countries the lead belongs
to other ministries, particularly environment or foreign ministries.
Consequently, the present article will answer the following research questions:
1. Which frames have characterised finance ministries’ positions in UN climate finance
negotiations?
2. Do particular frames correspond to the finance ministry having the lead on climate
finance or to economic or political characteristics of the state?
In order to answer the first question, the paper identifies which frames best describe the
finance ministry’s position regarding climate finance negotiations, or the position it thinks
the country should pursue in the negotiations. The focus will be on the above-mentioned
market failure or budget frames. The second question is answered by analysing whether
subscription to particular frames corresponds to the finance ministry having the lead, to its
belonging to an industrialised or developing economy or to its being part of a left- or right-
wing government.
Finance ministries’ roles as both veto actors and economic actors make them particu-
larly important regarding these negotiation positions. The former role grants them power
over expenditure decisions, while the latter role means that they prioritise economic
objectives over environmental ones and assess policies in terms of economic impact.
Focusing on the role of finance ministries regarding the USA, Indian, Indonesian and
Danish negotiation positions on climate finance since 2007 allows the possibility of
exploring differences between countries. The countries have been selected in order to cover
countries varying in terms of finance ministry lead on climate finance as well as on extra-
bureaucratic factors, namely being an industrialised or emerging economy and undergoing
government change.4 From a finance ministry perspective, the most relevant aspects of the
climate finance negotiations concern how much finance the industrialised countries should
provide individually and as a group, through which channels climate finance should flow,
and which principles should guide the allocation of funding.
The paper proceeds as follows: first, a theoretical framework is established, drawing on
the literature on bureaucratic politics and on the role of frames within policy-making
(Sect. 2). Subsequently, the issues in UNFCCC climate finance negotiations most pertinent
to this paper are outlined (Sect. 3.1), as are the explanatory factors prevalent in the aca-
demic literature on climate finance (Sect. 3.2). In Sect. 4, a set of propositions regarding
the position on the climate finance negotiations is established on the basis of the theoretical
framework. Section 5 discusses the methodology including case selection. Finally, the
theoretical framework is used to analyse the role of the budget and market failure frames in
the cases of Denmark, India, Indonesia and the USA (Sects. 6.1–6.4) and the distribution
of the frames between the countries (Sect. 6.5).
4 The paper focuses on emerging economies rather than developing countries in general since debates in the
UNFCCC have focused on whether the former group should contribute climate finance (see below).
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2 Theoretical framework: frames and finance ministries
The literature on the intragovernmental dynamics of negotiations provides a useful
framework for studying the role of finance ministries (Moravcsik 1998; see Downie 2014;
Raustiala and Victor 2004: 280, for examples of such approaches within climate gover-
nance). Often this literature draws on the bureaucratic politics literature, according to
which bureaucratic entities have different interests and—according to several scholars—
also different interpretive perspectives on issues (Allison and Zellikow 1999; Kaarbo
1998).
Scho¨n and Rein (1994: 23–29) argue that policy positions rest on frames, i.e. underlying
structures of belief, perception and appreciation. These structures emphasise different
features and relations of an issue as being particularly relevant. A frame has implications
for which actions it is logical to employ, what their consequences will be, and which
actions are appropriate in a given situation (e.g. if the frame defines it as an economic issue
rather than an environmental issue). It is important to distinguish between two under-
standings of the concept of a frame: first, frames as underlying structures of belief (Scho¨n
and Rein 1994), and second, the strategic use of frames by actors as devices to increase
support for a particular measure (Pralle 2009). The use of a particular frame in the latter
sense may or may not reflect the beliefs of the actor using the frame. The present paper will
use ‘‘frame’’ in the former sense of an underlying structure of belief.
Arguably, the frames inherent in the climate finance positions of finance ministries are
rooted in their two predominant roles. First, the role as ‘‘guardians of the budget’’ who
protect the fiscal balance has received most scholarly attention (Wildavsky 1986; Kingdon
2003). Besides limiting expenditure, this role also emphasises—to a lesser degree—se-
curing revenue (Wildavsky 1986). Finance ministries derive most of their power from this
role, which consists of setting the levels of funds allocated to the different policy areas as
part of the budgetary process, while ensuring that expenses do not exceed the established
goals (Wildavsky 1986). All demands for new or increased funding—including for climate
finance—must be approved by the finance ministry. According to this role, finance min-
istries view policy proposals through a cognitive lens which focuses on their impact on the
state budget, and a normative lens which defines additional expenditure, especially inef-
ficient expenditure, as undesirable.
Second, finance ministries’ role as guarantors of long-term macroeconomic stability and
growth; a role that may be as important as that of fiscal guardian. This role is based on
ideas rooted in the training of finance ministry employees within neoclassical economics
(Seabrooke 2011) which concern the efficiency of markets (Kanbur 2001) and which define
economic costs to society rather than to the public budget as the problem.
The two roles may pull in the same direction (when expenditure is seen as hindering
growth) as well as in opposite directions (when expenditure is seen as improving growth).
An important difference is time horizon: guarding the budget entails focusing on budget
items on next year’s budget, while protecting macroeconomic stability entails focusing on
developments often lasting decades.
The finance ministry having the lead on climate finance may also constitute an
important aspect of its role regarding climate finance. The lead ministry chairs meetings on
the issue, writes the first draft of negotiation texts and represents the country in the
negotiations. This paper focuses on the lead as it constitutes the single most important
aspect of the policy process: Having the lead exposes the finance ministry directly to the
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negotiations and confers upon the finance ministry the responsibility for achieving desir-
able outcomes in the negotiations.
3 The climate finance negotiations
3.1 Key issues in the climate finance negotiations
In order to study finance ministries’ positions, it is necessary to focus on the most pertinent
issues (to finance ministries) in the climate finance negotiations:
1. Which countries should contribute climate finance and how much?
2. Through which channels should climate finance flow?
3. Which principles should determine the allocation of climate finance?
Regarding the first issue, the negotiations have focused on collective and individual
targets for industrialised countries and the scope of the group of contributing countries. At
the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP15), the US$100 billion target was adopted.
The G77 ? China negotiating group had in the preceding negotiations proposed a target of
1–1.5% of industrialised countries’ gross domestic product (GDP), while several indus-
trialised countries were opposed to any quantified targets at all, although not to providing
climate finance (Bailer and Weiler 2015: 54–55). The negotiations have also focused on
whether there should be a burden-sharing formula (e.g. based on GDP or emissions)
determining individual countries’ contributions and whether emerging economies should
contribute in addition to the existing group of industrialised countries. The USA has been
particularly opposed to a burden-sharing formula, while developing countries have
opposed any measures to expand the group of contributors apart from encouraging—in the
words of the Paris Agreement—‘‘other Parties […] to provide or continue to provide such
support voluntarily’’ (UNFCCC 2015: Decision 1/CP.21, Article 9(2)). In order to avoid
‘‘watering down’’ of industrialised countries’ commitments, several developing countries
have insisted that there be strict requirements for measurement, reporting and verification
of climate finance, that climate finance be ‘‘new and additional’’ to development aid
(UNFCCC 1992: Article 4(3); see also special issue Editorial), and that private finance not
replace public finance. At the same time, several industrialised countries have argued that
such requirements could hinder utilising synergies between climate finance and develop-
ment aid as well as the leveraging of private finance, both of which can improve the
efficiency of climate finance (see Hall; Pauw, this issue).
The second issue concerns whether climate finance should flow through UN funds,
MDBs or bilateral channels. Industrialised countries prevail within bilateral and multi-
lateral development institutions compared to the UN climate institutions, in which
developing countries exert greater control (Moore 2012: 36–38; Ciplet et al. 2013). The
vagueness of the finance commitments in the Copenhagen Accord, Cancu´n Agreements
and Paris Agreement grants industrialised countries significant discretion over these
decisions, including how much to allocate to the UNFCCC Green Climate Fund (UNFCCC
2009, 2010, 2015).5
5 Although the industrialised countries as a group are obliged to channel a ‘‘significant’’ proportion of their
adaptation finance through the GCF (UNFCCC 2009: Decision 2/CP.15, paragraph 8; 2010: Decision
1/CP.16, paragraph 100).
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The third issue concerns principles for the allocation of climate finance, of which the
most pertinent for this paper are efficiency and equity (see e.g. Persson and Remling 2014;
Stadelmann et al. 2014). Efficiency refers to the ‘‘allocation of public resources such that
net social benefits are maximised’’ (Persson and Remling 2014: 489). Thus, efficient
climate finance is spent where it provides the greatest amount of mitigation or adaptation6
for a given amount of money, which generally means (at least in the case of mitigation)
focusing on emerging economies rather than the least developed countries.
Equity implies that the burden of mitigating and adapting to climate change should be
distributed in a way that is fair, with normative principles such as CBDR and historical
responsibility determining what is meant by equitable (Hof et al. 2011; Dellink et al. 2009).
CBDR—a principled enshrined in the UNFCCC (1992, Article 3(1))—implies that the
industrialised countries shall take on a larger burden than developing countries (see special
issue Editorial), and that—according to inter alia developing countries—developing
countries are entitled to finance for mitigation and adaptation with few conditions on how
funding is used (possibly downplaying efficiency).
3.2 Factors influencing national positions on climate finance
The academic literature on climate finance has mainly focused on issues of generation and
allocation (see the contributions to Haites 2014; Michaelowa 2012; Betzold and Weiler,
this issue) rather than on UN climate finance negotiations. However, Bailer and Weiler
(2015) studied the impact of different factors (vulnerability, power, democracy, fossil fuel
sector, domestic environmental standards and membership of environmental organizations)
on negotiating positions concerning mitigation finance and emissions reduction targets. On
a related note, the literature explaining the provision and allocation of climate finance has
studied the impact of factors such as: the environmental orientation of the government or of
the public in the donor/provider country (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2011), level of
income, carbon dioxide emissions or quality of government (for all three factors, see
Halimanjaya and Papyrakis 2012), and the involvement of different government ministries
or agencies (Pickering et al. 2015).
The foreign policy literature has demonstrated the importance of bureaucratic politics
for negotiation positions (Kaarbo 1998; Allison and Zellikow 1999), including the role of
finance ministries in defining an EU position on climate finance (Skovgaard 2015), and in
the allocation of climate finance (Pickering et al. 2015). Since climate finance does not
affect domestic vested interests to the extent that mitigation commitments do (Bailer and
Weiler 2015: 60–62), finance ministries have (all things equal) better possibilities for
influencing national negotiating positions than in the case of mitigation commitments (for a
comparative study of the domestic drivers of mitigation policy and negotiation positions,
see Harrison and Sundstrom 2007).
4 Operationalising the theoretical framework
The two roles of finance ministries translate into two finance ministerial framings of
climate policy (Skovgaard 2012: 3–4). According to the budget frame, climate policy is an
expenditure that should be limited. However, according to the market failure frame,
6 This paper mainly focuses on mitigation finance due to its predominant share of climate finance (see
special issue Editorial) and its greater importance to finance ministries (see below).
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climate change constitutes a market failure (more specifically a negative externality) that
should be corrected in order to create a long-term optimal outcome, even if it requires
significant public expenditure. The market failure frame draws on neoclassical environ-
mental economics (see Stern et al. 2013).7 The cognitive elements of this frame imply that
environmental outcomes are measured in terms of economic costs and benefits, while
actors are assumed to create optimal outcomes if given the right incentives. The normative
elements imply that climate change is problematic because it produces an outcome that is
less than economically optimal for (domestic) society as a whole (Jacobs 1997: 371–372).
The two frames are ideal-types, and often policy involves more than one of them but
nonetheless clusters around one frame rather than the other. The frames may clash when
climate policies require expenditure. In order to understand the role of finance ministries,
these two frames are essential, and adherence to specific principles (e.g. CBDR) will be
understood in the light of how such adherence fits with the two frames.8
The analysis will explore whether the position of a finance ministry can be characterised
in terms of either the budget or market failure frame by testing whether the ministry’s
positions on key issues in the negotiations were consistent with one of the two frames (see
Table 1). The relationship between frames and priorities has been established on the basis
of their logical ‘‘fit’’, i.e. whether the specific priority plausibly follows from the
assumptions contained in one frame rather than the other. The frames do not necessarily
imply a distinct position regarding every priority, e.g. in the case of industrialised countries
the budget frame does not imply particular preferences regarding channels or allocation
principles.
Finance targets may be the issue on which the difference is most pronounced. Arguably,
the market failure frame (in the cases of industrialised and emerging economies) implies a
preference for a high collective target and willingness to provide climate finance on the
condition that other countries also contribute finance or act against climate change. It is
important that emerging economies also contribute climate finance and/or significant self-
financed domestic action in order to address climate change effectively and thus promote
long-term economic stability. This willingness to contribute climate finance mainly con-
cerns mitigation finance, since adaptation finance does not as such address the market
failure aspect of climate change. The market failure frame ideally recommends global
carbon pricing internalising the externality of climate change (Stern 2006). However, given
that such a solution is politically unrealistic, using climate finance to cover parts of the
additional costs of mitigation and possibly also compensate for adaptation is the preferred
solution. The budget frame implies that industrialised countries will prefer to avoid or
minimise collective and especially individual targets, while emerging economies will
prefer to avoid climate finance commitments at the same time as they seek to maximise the
commitments of industrialised countries, as this can have positive impact on state revenue.
Hence, in the case of emerging economies, the key difference between the market failure
and the budget frame is not in the size of the global target or in the desire to maximise
finance from industrialised countries, but in which countries should contribute climate
finance.
Concerning channels for finance, the expectation is that differences in position will be
less pronounced across the two frames. The market failure frame implies a pronounced
preference across industrialised and emerging economies for MDBs, due to the economic
7 Whereas the budget frame is not rooted in a specific theoretical paradigm.
8 This does not explain why the finance ministry adopt positions consistent with a particular frame: a
finance ministry may very well adopt particular positions because they are considered normatively right.
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outlook (similar to the market failure frame) of these development banks. In the case of
industrialised countries, the two frames equally imply reluctance regarding UN institutions.
The budget frame implies diverging positions between industrialised and emerging
economies. In the case of industrialised country finance ministries, the budget frame
implies a preference for bilateral channels and to a lesser degree MDBs, because these
channels grant them more control and guarantees that fiduciary standards will be met. In
the case of developing country finance ministries, the budget frame implies a preference
for UN institutions in which they have more influence over the allocation of funds.
Concerning the principles for allocating climate finance, the market failure frame
implies emphasis on efficiency, understood as maximising net social benefits on a global
and long-term scale taking into account the net present value of future climate change. In
the case of industrialised countries, the budget frame also implies an emphasis on effi-
ciency understood as maximising the cost-effectiveness of mitigation finance, as mitiga-
tion, unlike adaptation, is perceived (by most scholars: see special issue Editorial) as a
global public good. Yet, in emerging economies this frame implies reluctance to use
efficiency as a principle for allocating climate finance. This is because efficiency would
allow industrialised countries to minimise their contribution and create competition
between developing countries over climate finance.
The roles of the two frames can be summed up in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Finance ministries consistently adopt positions on priorities in negotia-
tions that are consistent with one particular frame.
It is also worth exploring whether the use of the two frames by different finance
ministries corresponds to different contextual factors. One such factor is having the lead,
which means chairing intragovernmental policy processes, defining the national negotia-
tion position and presenting this position in UNFCCC negotiations. Arguably, chairing the
process would induce the finance ministry to adopt a ‘‘balanced’’ position and avoid
positions radically different from those of other ministries. Furthermore, participating
directly in the negotiations means that the finance ministry is directly exposed to the
positions of other negotiators, and therefore possibly less likely to adopt positions it knows
would isolate it in the negotiations, such as minimising its contribution to climate finance.
Both aspects could make the finance ministry less likely to adopt positions aligned with the
budget frame.
Table 1 Finance ministry frames and priorities in the negotiations
Priorities Frames
Market failure Budget
Targets Willingness to provide significant climate
finance on condition of concerted effort
Minimise individual contribution
Emerging economies: maximise
contribution of industrialised countries
Channels MDBs Industrialised countries: bilateral, to a lesser
degree MDBs
Emerging economies: UNFCCC institutions
Allocation
principles
Efficiency Emerging economies: compatible with
CBDR and historical responsibility
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Proposition 2a Finance ministries that have the lead on climate finance adopted posi-
tions on key issues more aligned with the market failure frame than the budget frame.
However, it is possible that the extra-bureaucratic factors of belonging to an emerging
economy or industrialised country and to a left-wing or right-wing government matter for
the finance ministry’s framing. Regarding the former, it is likely that finance ministries will
align along the industrialised/emerging economies divide, since this is the most salient
divide in the UNFCCC climate negotiations.
Proposition 2b Finance ministries within the same country grouping are likely to share
the same frame.
Finally, since right-wing governments tend to be less concerned with environmental
issues (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2011: 2014) and more concerned about keeping
public expenditure down than left-wing governments, it is expected that finance ministries
belonging to right-wing governments are more inclined to align with the budget frame (see
also Pickering and Mitchell, this issue).
Proposition 2c Finance ministries that are part of right-wing governments are more
likely to align with the budget frame.
5 Methods
The countries studied are Denmark, India, Indonesia and the USA. These countries have
been selected as they represent variation on whether the finance ministry had the climate
finance lead and on being, respectively, an industrialised (Annex II) or an emerging
economy (non-Annex II; see Table 2). Furthermore, all of the countries have changed
government, which makes it possible to study whether the political orientation of the
government is influential. All four countries have played important roles in UN climate
finance negotiations. Two emerging economies have been selected since the discussion of
contributions from this class of countries means that they have more explicit fiscal interest
in all three priorities (including whether they should contribute climate finance) than other
developing countries. Consequently, the findings from India and Indonesia are relevant for
other emerging economies, but not necessarily for other kinds of developing countries.
The analysis relies on a combination of key informant interviews, official documents
and secondary sources. The key informants (a total of 14) were primarily senior officials
currently or previously responsible for climate finance, and based in finance ministries and
other key ministries (mainly environment and foreign ministries) from the countries
studied. A total of nine finance ministry officials and at least two from each finance
ministry were interviewed, the remaining five coming from environment and foreign
affairs ministries. Four interviews were conducted with US government officials, two with
Indian ones, five with Danish ones and three with Indonesian ones. The official documents
comprise all documents published by the finance ministry and addressing climate finance,
including reports and policy documents.
The analysis involves two stages. First, official documents and interviews have been
used to identify both how climate finance is framed as a policy issue in general terms
(without reference to concrete negotiation positions) by the finance ministry and which
positions the finance ministry has taken on the above-mentioned key issues.9 On this basis,
9 The combination of interview and documentary data helps to corroborate evidence.
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the finance ministry’s prevalent frame (if any) is identified, as well as possible differences
with other ministries. It may be methodologically difficult to distinguish the positions of
finance ministries from the overall government position, especially if they are relatively
similar. Second, the paper analyses whether finance ministries that had the lead, belonged
to industrialised or emerging economies, or to left- or right-wing governments were more
likely to use the market failure or the budget frame.
There are important challenges when it comes to studying negotiation positions, not to
mention a particular ministry’s position regarding the negotiation position, as these pref-
erences maybe both very context dependent and politically sensitive. In order to address
these difficulties, questions were kept on a general level and mainly focused on past issues
rather than current ones.
6 Analysis: the role of finance ministries
This section consists of the case studies of the different finance ministries, followed by a
comparison and discussion of which variables the use of frames corresponds to (see
Table 3).
6.1 USA
The US Department of the Treasury’s lead on climate finance dates back to 2008–2009
(interview with former senior US Treasury Official, 8/4/2014). Other departments and
agencies involved are the White House, the State Department (which leads on UN climate
negotiations generally) and to a lesser degree the Environmental Protection Agency. On the
general level, the Treasury framed climate finance in terms of market failure, more
specifically ‘‘as one piece of the international puzzle […] recognising the challenges that
the developing countries face, and the public good nature of mitigation especially, there is
a recognition that is climate finance will be an important part’’ (ibid.).
Regarding the key climate finance issues, the Treasury (and the administration in
general) was not in favour of targets, particularly the idea of a collective public finance
target (ibid.). Following the adoption of the $100 billion target at COP15, the US gov-
ernment did not want to put forward targets for its contribution of public finance (a position
shared among all US officials involved in the climate talks). This was due to domestic
opposition, particularly Republican scrutiny of any climate-related issue in the House of
Representatives, and to it being considered less relevant than mainstreaming climate
concerns into development aid and leveraging private finance (interview with former
senior US Treasury official, 6/5/2014; US Department of the Treasury 2009a, 2010).
Mainstreaming and leveraging were emphasised because the Treasury considered the
effects of climate finance to be more important than how much the countries provide.
Regarding channels for finance, the Treasury was sceptical of the UNFCCC, which was
seen as unable to provide the required economic and social safeguards or to prevent the
Table 2 Country cases selected
Industrialised Emerging
Finance ministry lead USA India
Finance ministry secondary role Denmark Indonesia
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money from disappearing (interview with former senior US Treasury Official, 8/4/2014).
Rather, the US Treasury preferred using existing bilateral and multilateral channels that
could promote efficiency and ensure that fiduciary standards were met (US Department of
the Treasury 2009b). Concerning key principles, the Treasury emphasised efficiency,
particularly regarding the design of climate finance mechanisms in ways that provide as
much value for money as possible (interview with former senior US Treasury Official, 8/4/
2014). This included an important role for private finance, which was seen as crucial for an
effective response to climate change, and as easing the pressure on public finance.
Altogether, there was not one specific frame which consistently underpinned the
Treasury’s climate finance position. While the Treasury on a general level framed climate
finance in market failure terms, in terms of concrete positions it placed a greater emphasis
on minimising the US contribution than one would expect from the market failure frame.
Although this—especially in the case of US opposition to targets—to a large degree can be
understood in terms of domestic opposition, the Treasury’s positions were generally
compatible with both frames. The position of the Treasury was generally shared across US
Table 3 Comparison of framings, positions and lead among finance ministries
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Positions corresponding to the market failure frame are listed in italics, lead ministries are in bold
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departments and agencies, which also faced the same problem of getting climate-related
legislation through Congress (interview with former senior Environmental Protection
Agency and White House official, 7/4/2014).
6.2 India
The Indian Ministry of Finance has had the lead on climate finance since 2011, when a
designated Climate Finance Unit was set-up within the Ministry. The predominant theme
in how the Ministry of Finance Climate addressed climate finance was the importance of
the equity principle of CBDR, as is evident in the official documents of the Indian Ministry
of Finance (2009, 2012; Dasgupta and Climate Change Finance Unit 2015) as well as key
informant interviews. As mentioned above, in the case of emerging economies CBDR fits
with the budget frame but not the market failure frame, and in the official Ministry of
Finance documents climate change is framed as an issue of justice rather than a market
failure.
Regarding targets, the Ministry of Finance focused on targets for the industrialised
countries while being opposed to developing country commitments to provide climate
finance (Indian Ministry of Finance 2012). The Ministry of Finance particularly stressed
the importance of meeting the $100 billion target and criticised a joint OECD-Climate
Policy Initiative report (2015) that argued that industrialised countries had mobilised on
average $62 billion in climate finance in 2014 (Dasgupta and Climate Change Finance Unit
2015).10 Instead the Indian Finance Ministry argued that only money disbursed (rather than
just pledged or committed) from designated climate funds could be considered truly new
and additional climate finance, money that totalled only $2.2 billion since the inception of
these funds. Thus, the position of the Ministry of Finance was clear-cut: the industrialised
countries should be held accountable to their targets and to their commitment to provide
new and additional climate finance, while the developing countries are not subject to such
obligations. This position can be understood in terms of Indian commitment to CBDR
(interview with senior Indian Finance Ministry official, 3/11/2014; Indian Ministry of
Finance 2012) and in terms of the budget frame that pulled in the same direction.
Concerning channels for finance, the Ministry of Finance saw the Green Climate Fund
as crucial since the developing countries could have a significant say in the allocation of
climate finance via this Fund, unlike bilateral and private funding (Indian Ministry of
Finance 2013). This position corresponds to a general preference for UN institutions
(interview with senior Indian Finance Ministry official, 3/11/2014). When it comes to the
key principles, besides the above-mentioned emphasis on CBDR and new and additional
climate finance, the Ministry of Finance (2009) also stressed historical responsibility.
Efficiency was considered important but subordinate to CBDR, e.g. leveraging private
finance being considered positive as long as it does not undermine industrialised countries’
public finance commitments (Indian Ministry of Finance 2013; Dasgupta and Climate
Change Finance Unit 2015).
Altogether, the position of the Ministry of Finance on key issues is consistent with the
emphasis on CBDR and consequently with the budget frame. The emphasis on CBDR has
characterised the Indian position in the climate negotiations generally speaking (Thaker
and Leiserowitz 2014) and was shared with other involved ministries such as the Envi-
ronment Ministry.




The Indonesian Ministry of Finance started addressing climate finance in 2007 when it
hosted the first meeting of finance ministries on climate change (in the context of COP13 in
Bali). Whereas the lead on climate finance negotiation belongs to the National Council on
Climate Change (DNPI), a semi-autonomous body consisting of DNPI staff and repre-
sentatives of key ministries, the finance and environment ministries as well as the National
Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) are the most engaged ministries regarding
climate finance (Indonesian Ministry of Finance 2016).
In terms of the overarching framing of climate finance as a policy issue, the Indonesian
Ministry of Finance occupied a position sharing several of the tenets of the market failure
frame while emphasising CBDR. The market failure frame is evident in the Ministry of
Finance’s 2009 publication ‘‘Economic and Fiscal Policy Strategies for Climate Change
Mitigation in Indonesia’’, which stresses the importance of economically sound policies
and carbon pricing in Indonesia, and frames climate finance as an instrument for ‘‘covering
additional investment costs and providing compensation for economic opportunity costs’’
(Indonesian Ministry of Finance 2009: 44). According to this publication, climate finance
is necessary as developing countries account for half of global emissions and ‘‘most of the
abatement options at any given level of marginal costs are in developing countries’’ (ibid.),
a clear example of the market failure frame. The Ministry of Finance generally emphasises
that a key aspect of climate finance is to send a signal to the markets, while also
emphasising industrialised country responsibility and the need for international finance in
Indonesia (interview with senior Indonesian Finance Ministry Official, 24/6/2015;
Indonesian Ministry of Finance 2016).
Regarding targets, the Ministry of Finance has stressed the importance of industrialised
country targets and particularly of meeting the $100 billion target, including a clear
pathway towards this target (interview with senior Indonesian Finance Ministry Official,
24/6/2015). The Ministry of Finance has stressed that the Indonesian government provides
two-thirds of all climate finance spent in Indonesia, and while it remains willing to con-
tinue such financing, increased co-financing from industrialised countries will be essential
to increasing the level of ambition (Interview with senior Indonesian official, 11/3/2015;
Indonesian Ministry of Finance and Climate Policy Initiative 2014). According to this
view, emerging economies should also contribute climate finance (Indonesian Ministry of
Finance 2009: 62), which is why the Ministry of Finance supported Indonesia’s contri-
bution to the Green Climate Fund. Concerning channels for finance, the Ministry of
Finance has stressed that the Green Climate Fund should be the primary channel of
international climate finance, yet this should not eliminate the important role of bilateral
climate finance (interview with senior Indonesian Finance Ministry Official, 24/6/2015).
On key principles, the Ministry of Finance has stressed the importance not only of effi-
ciency (similarly to the industrialised country finance ministries) but also of the distinction
between industrialised and developing countries (Indonesian Ministry of Finance 2009;
2016), although not in as clear-cut a fashion as the Indian Ministry of Finance wants.
Altogether, in terms of finance ministerial frames the position of the Ministry of Finance
is best described in terms of the market failure frame, while the budget frame-related
concept of CBDR also was important. All of the involved ministries have generally been in
agreement (interview with senior DNPI official, 11/12/2014).
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6.4 Denmark
Within the Danish government, the Ministry of Climate Change and Energy has the lead on
climate finance, while the Finance Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were
closely involved in the definition of the climate finance negotiation position. The Finance
Ministry has addressed climate finance since 2007, and regarding the overarching framing,
climate finance was framed in terms of market failure. As global carbon pricing is not
politically feasible, the primary purpose of climate finance is to correct the externality
through financing mitigation actions, as part of a global mitigation system involving all
aspects of developing countries’ economies (interview with former senior Danish Finance
Ministry official, 13/1/2014). At the same time, the Finance Ministry also sought to guard
the public finances and limit spending, this being reconciled with the previous objective
(correcting the externality) by focusing on using climate finance as efficiently as possible.
The Finance Ministry was in favour of collective as well as individual climate finance
targets for countries. It opposed the sharp distinction between industrialised and devel-
oping countries, which it saw as outdated and counterproductive. Instead burden-sharing
based on emissions and/or level of income was considered preferable (ibid.). Conse-
quently, the Finance Ministry did not want Denmark to contribute significantly more than
its fair share calculated on the basis of emissions and income. Regarding channels for
finance, the Finance Ministry was somewhat sceptical of leaving too much influence with
the UNFCCC institutions, and preferred using a range of channels including MDBs and
bilateral finance. Concerning the key principles, efficiency has been considered crucial and
mainly understood in global and far-sighted terms.
Within the Danish government, the Finance Ministry’s emphasis on avoiding exces-
sively high contributions and its scepticism towards the UNFCCC at times put it at odds
with the climate and the foreign affairs ministries. The latter ministries wanted higher
levels of climate finance than the Finance Ministry and were more positive towards the
UNFCCC. The position of the Finance Ministry itself was rather consistently based on the
market failure frame, although the budget frame is evident regarding targets and channels
for finance.
6.5 Comparisons
The analysis has shown that the positions of finance ministries on specific priorities in the
negotiations mainly clustered around specific frames, thus largely supporting Proposition
1. Hence, a finance ministry that framed climate finance as a solution to a market failure
and was willing to contribute climate finance also tended to support MDBs as a finance
channel and efficiency as a key principle. Yet, there are examples of dissonance, e.g. the
US Treasury, which on an overarching level defined climate finance in market failure terms
but adopted specific positions more in line with the budget frame. In the case of the Danish
and Indonesian finance ministries, the market failure frames were clearly prevalent,
although the budget frame also was observable. The position of the Indian Ministry of
Finance is better understood in terms of the budget frame due to its CBDR emphasis.
Regarding the correspondence between having the lead and a particular frame, it
appears that the Indonesian and Danish finance ministries—which did not have the lead—
adopted positions more in line with the market failure frame than the Indian and US finance
ministries, both of which had the lead, thus failing to confirm Proposition 2a. This
alignment across the industrialised/developing countries fault line also partly fails to
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confirm Proposition 2b, although the notable similarities between India and Indonesia
(particularly their emphasis on CBDR), to some degree supports the proposition.
On Proposition 2c (right-wing governments corresponding with use of the budget
frame), some of the countries changed government from right-wing to left-wing (Denmark
in 2011, the USA in 2009), from centre to left-wing (Indonesia in 2014) or from left-wing
to right-wing (India in 2014; Denmark in 2015) during the period of analysis. Yet, the
proposition is not supported as it is only in the USA that this change of government
corresponds with significant changes in the finance ministry position towards a more
market failure frame-oriented position. The USA change from the Bush administration to
the Obama administration constituted a major shift in both domestic climate policy and
climate negotiation positions. This shift is largely due to climate change being highly
politicised in the USA (McCright and Dunlap 2011), but also due to the high level of
change in government personnel following US elections. In both respects—particularly the
latter—the US must be considered a most-likely case for changes in government being
important. Thus, it is only possible to generalise from the case of the USA to other
countries in which climate change is equally politically salient (see also Pickering and
Mitchell, this issue).
7 Conclusion
The positions of most finance ministries in the present paper mainly clustered around one
of two frames: the market failure frame or the budget frame. Ministries aligning with the
former defined climate finance as a way of addressing the market failure of climate change,
while ministries aligning with the latter defined climate finance as budget expenditure to be
limited. The market failure frame was mainly important to the Danish and Indonesian
finance ministries’ position, and the budget frame mainly to the US and particularly
the Indian ones. Thus, to a large degree the budget frame corresponded with the finance
ministry having the lead on climate finance and the market failure frame with the finance
ministry not having the lead. The use of the two frames criss-crossed the divide between
industrialised and emerging economies—although not regarding CBDR—while the frames
have not changed when the government did, except for in the USA.
The market failure frame was—in the industrialised economies—an important
requirement for finance ministries’ acknowledging the importance of climate finance
(mainly mitigation finance). This capacity for taking the issue seriously does not imply less
fragmentation within the climate finance system. The finance ministries did not converge
around one frame, something which could have reduced normative and institutional
fragmentation, especially if the frame had been that of market failure.
The fact that it was the finance ministries with lead roles that subscribed most strongly
to the budget frame, potentially leading to more self-interested positions, arguably con-
stitutes a domestic cause of increased norm fragmentation. Yet, the convergence between
the Indonesian and Danish finance ministries indicates that the market failure frame opens
up possibilities for alignment between finance ministries from industrialised and emerging
economies. Such convergence is arguably based on shared epistemic outlooks based on
training as economists. The fact that the US and Indian finance ministry officials also
shared such a background indicates that it constitutes a necessary rather than sufficient
condition for convergence. These findings indicate that strengthening forums and epistemic
communities for finance ministry representatives and built around the market failure frame
Limiting costs or correcting market failures? Finance… 103
123
can be a fruitful venue for reducing norm fragmentation, but the success of such forums
will depend on their ability to overcome domestic forces pulling in the direction of the
budget frame. Furthermore, to the extent that these forums exist outside the UNFCCC,
such forums will increase institutional fragmentation.
There remains a need for further research the causal role of these frames, specifically
whether frames as underlying structures of belief actually influenced the finance ministerial
position, as the consistency between each ministry’s position on the different issues sug-
gests. It is also worth exploring the degree to which the frames influenced the national
negotiation positions. It is also useful to study how finance ministries treat climate issues
that do not involve expenditure, for instance fossil fuel subsidy reform, or to focus on the
role of finance ministries regarding the delivery of climate finance.
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